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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this methodology is to provide a procedure based
upon NASA Guidelines and Standards and National Consensus Codes
which define a range of allowable inspection and certification
requirements dependent upon the remaining life, the potential
hazard and mission requirements of a particular system. These
procedures should not be construed to guarantee the absolute safety
of the particular systems but rather that they may be accordingly
operated at an "acceptable level of risk."
The methodology establishes a "Criticality Code" based on a Risk
Assessment Analysis, a Mission Essentiality Analysis and a
Remaining Life Analysis. Criticality Codes i, 2 and 3 are then
assigned based on these analyses and provide Inspection Intervals
of I, 3 and 6 years respectively with complete recertification
every 6 years. The Risk Assessment Analysis is performed
in accordance with the NASA Basic Safety Manual, NHB 1700.1, and is
judged on the severity and probability of the occurrence of the
worst case accident for the particular pressure vessel or system.
The Mission Essentiality Analysis is derived from NMI 1710.3B,
Design, Inspection and Certification of Pressure Vessels and
Pressurized Systems. It considers the systems' capability for safe
mission conduct, any redundant capabilities and the cost or
implications of system failure. The Remaining Life Analysis is
developed from the National Board Inspection Code, ANSI/NB-23 and
is based on minimum wall thicknesses (as determined by the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code), corrosion rates (as determined by
the requirements of the National Board Inspection Code) and the
actual inspection intervals for the particular system.
All decisions, judgements and considerations used in the afore-
mentioned analyses are formally recorded and become a part of the
permanent record and recertification files which can be recalled,
reviewed and/or revised at any time should the situation warrant.
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DESIGN TEMPERATURE - The metal temperature used in the design of a
vessel for determining the minimum required thickness of the
components. Also, the metal temperature used for selecting the
maximum allowable stress for the materials used in the vessel.
DISCREPANCY - Condition of any hardware or software in which one or
more characteristics do not conform to the specified requirements.
EFFICIENCY OF A WELDED JOINT - A numerical (decimal) quantity
expressed as a multiplier of the allowable stress value used in the
design of a joint•
HAZARD - Existing or potential condition that can result in or
contribute to a mishap with a risk of harm.
HAZARD LEVEL CATEGORIZATION - Hazards are classified in following
four categories:
i. Category I - Catastrophic - Hazardous occurrence whose
worst-case effects will cause death or severe injury to
personnel or loss of system•
• Category II - Critical - Hazardous occurrence in which the
worst-case effects will cause severe personnel injury
(hospitalization) or major system damage (performance
impairment), or will require immediate corrective action to
prevent personnel death or loss of system.
• Category III- Marginal - Hazardous occurrence whose worst-
case effects can be counteracted or controlled without
serious personnel injury (first aid) or equipment damage•
• Category IV - Negligible - Hazardous occurrence in which the
worst-case effects could not result in personnel injury or
equipment damage.
HAZARD PROBABILITY - Aggregate likelihood of occurrence, stated in
qualitative or quantitative terms, of the individual hazardous
events that create a specific hazard.
HAZARD SEVERITY - Assessment of the worst-case harm from credible
mishaps that could occur because of a specific hazard•
HYDROSTATIC TEST - A test performed on a pressure vessel or system
in which the vessel or system is filled with a liquid (usually
water) and pressurized to a designated level in a manner prescribed
in the applicable code.
IN-SERVICE INSPECTION - Inspection performed after a system has
been initially put into service. The system may have to be
inoperative during such inspection•
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE STRESS VALUE - The maximum unit stress
permissible for a specific material used in the appropriate design
formulas.
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GLOSSARYOF TERMS
CATASTROPHIC CONDITION - Hazardous condition that may cause death,
major system destruction or loss of crew or vehicle.
CATASTROPHIC FAILURE - Failure that causes loss of life or loss of
a system.
CERTIFICATION - The documented status that qualifies a vessel or
system to operate in the service for which it is intended.
COST (MISHAP) - Direct costs of a NASA mishap for repair, retest,
program delays, replacement or recovery of NASA materials including
hours, material, and contract costs. Not included are the indirect
costs of a mishap for cleanup, investigation, injury or normal
operational shutdown.
CREDIBLE CONDITION (EVENT) - Condition (event) that can occur and
is likely to occur. A probability of occurrence greater than 10%
is generally considered as credible.
CRITICAL CONDITION - Hazardous condition that may lead to a mishap
with severe occupational injury or illness, or major damage to
property or equipment.
CRITICAL FUNCTION - Any system, equipment or facility function
that, by not performing as expected, causes a critical condition.
CRITICAL ITEM - Single failure point (single point of failure) in
a life or mission-essential application, that, as determined by the
results of failure mode and effects analysis or other safety
analysis, is essential to the safe or reliable functioning of a
system or subsystem.
CRITICALITY - Categorization of a hardware failure, software error,
or fault based upon an evaluation of the degree of impact of that
failure, error or fault on the development or operation of a system
(often used to determine whether or when a failure, error or fault
will be corrected).
DERATED VESSEL OR SYSTEM - A vessel or system that has been judged
to be unsafe, unsuitable or unnecessary for continued operation at
its original design pressure and/or temperature limits, and has
been recertified to operate at a lesser pressure and/or temperature
limit range.
DESIGN PRESSURE - Used for the design of a pressure vessel to
determine the permissible thickness or physical characteristics of
its parts. Design pressure must constitute the most severe
conditions of coincident pressure and temperature expected in
normal operation, and the difference in pressure between vessel
inside and outside or in two chambers of a combination unit. (See
Maximum Allowable Working Pressure).
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MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE WORKING PRESSURE - Maximum gage pressure
permissible at the top of a pressure vessel or other component, in
its normal operating position for a designated temperature. It is
used for the pressure setting of pressure relief devices protecting
a component based on its allowable stress value and functional
capability. This pressure is synonymous with "rated pressure."
The design pressure may be used in cases where the value of maximum
allowable working pressure is not found.
MAXIMUMEXPECTEDOPERATING PRESSURE- Maximum pressure at expected
operating temperatures at which a pressurized system or component
actually operates in a particular space vehicle or ground support
application. It includes the effects of environmental conditions
or vibrations, vehicle acceleration, pressure surge, fluid shock,
thermal degradation of strength, and relief valve tolerance. This
pressure is synonymous with maximum operating pressure or maximum
working pressure.
MAXIMUMOPERATING PRESSURE- Maximum pressure at which the system
or component actually operates in a particular application. During
design it is synonymous with maximum expected operating pressure
for calculating the specified factor of safety. If a lower
pressure setting is to be applied during normal operations, it will
be used to calculate the actual factor of safety.
MISHAP - Event that results in death, injury or illness; in damage
to property or equipment; or in a mission or test failure that has
significant program impact or visibility.
MISSION CRITICAL - Item or function that must retain
operational capability for safe mission conduct.
its
NATIONAL CONSENSUS CODE/STANDARD - Any standard or modifications
thereof which (i) has been adopted or promulgated by a nationally
recognized standards-producing organization under procedures
whereby it can be determined by the Secretary of Labor or by the
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health
that persons interested and affected by the standard have reached
substantial agreement on its adoption; (2) was formulated in a
manner that afforded an opportunity for diverse views to be
considered; and (3) has been so designated by the Secretary or the
Assistant Secretary, after consultation with other appropriate
Federal agencies. A standard, as used in this definition, requires
conditions or activities necessary or appropriate to provide safe
and healthful employment and places of employment.
OPERATING OR WORKING TEMPERATURE - The metal temperature that will
be maintained in the part of the vessel under consideration during
normal operation.
OPERATING PRESSURE - The pressure at the top of a vessel at which
it normally operates. It shall not exceed the maximum allowable
working pressure.
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PNEUMATIC OR PNEUMOSTATIC TEST - A test performed on a pressure
vessel or system in which air or gas is introduced and pressurized
to a designated level in a manner prescribed in the applicable
code.
PRESSURE SYSTEMS ENGINEER - A person who has the necessary
qualifications to evaluate designs with respect to code conformance
and the authority to perform or cause to be performed the
evaluation of results or any and all tests, inspections and
examinations performed on pressure systems in order to determine
the next period of inspection, derating requirements, rerating
requirements, modifications, repairs, etc.
PRESSURE VESSEL - Any vessel used for the storage or handling of
gas or liquid under positive pressure. Included are components of
systems such as heat exchanger shells and drying towers and other
shell structures.
PRESSURIZED SYSTEM - Grouping of pressure vessels or pressurized
structure, tubing, pipe, hose, fittings, valves, pressure relief
devices, etc., that are exposed to and designed for pressure.
PROBABILITY - Likelihood that a given event will occur per unit
opportunity for the occurrence.
PROOF TEST - A pressure test performed to establish the maximum
allowable working pressure of a vessel, system or component
thereof; (1) when the strength cannot be computed with a
satisfactory assurance of accuracy; (2) when the thickness cannot
be determined by means of the design rule of the applicable code or
standard; or (3) when the critical flaw size to cause failure at
the certified pressure cannot be identified by other nondestructive
test methods. This test shall be performed in a manner equivalent
to one of the methods specified in Paragraph UG-IOI of the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division i, latest
edition.
RECERTIFICATION - The procedure by which a previously certified
vessel or system, by appropriate tests, inspections, examination
and documentation, is qualified to continue or be returned to
operations at the designed pressure.
RECERTIFICATION INTERVAL - The period of time between
recertification when a certified status is maintained through
documented periodic examinations and inspections to determine
vessel or system condition (time between major inspections).
REDUNDANCY - Use of more that one means to accomplish a given
function and where more than one means must fail before the
function fails.
RELIEF VALVE SET PRESSURE - See paragraph UG-125, Section VIII,
Division I, ASME Boiler Code and Part AR, Section VIII, Division 2,
ASME Boiler Code.
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RISK - Exposure to the chance of injury or loss. It is a function
of the possible frequency of occurrence of an undesired event, of
the potential severity of resulting consequences and of the
uncertainties associated with the frequency and severity.
RISK ASSESSMENT- Process of qualitative risk categorization or
quantitative risk estimation, followed by the evaluation of risk
significance.
SYSTEM - Composite of hardware, software, procedures and skills
that perform a functional role.
TANK- Any vessel used for the storage or handling of liquids where
the internal pressure is only a function of the liquid head or a
combination of liquid head and vapor pressure.
UNFIRED PRESSUREVESSELS AND SYSTEMS - In the context for which
this phrase is used in this guide it is intended to cover all
pressure vessels and pressurized systems for which in-service
inspection is not otherwise covered by codes and standards.
VACUUMSYSTEM- An assembly of components under vacuum, including
vessels, piping, valves, relief devices, pumps, expansion joints,
gages, etc.
VACUUMVESSEL - A vessel in which the internal pressure has been
reduced to a level less than that of the surrounding atmosphere.
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INTRODUCTION
1.0
i.i
1.2
1.3
Scope
This methodology shall be used to determine inspection
procedures and intervals for components contained within tank
mounted air compressor systems (TMAC) and base mounted air
compressor systems (BMAC) included in the Pressure Vessel and
System Recertification inventory at the Goddard Space Flight
Center.
Purpose
The purpose of this document is to establish and document a
method of determining TMAC and BMAC inspection procedures and
intervals based on NASA specifications and National Consensus
Codes to insure that all such systems are operated at an
"acceptable level of risk."
Criticality Codes, Definition Of
For the purpose of this methodology, a Criticality Code is a
number 1,2 or 3 assigned to a pressure vessel, system or
component based on the results of a Risk Assessment Analysis,
a Mission Essentiality Analysis and a Remaining Life Analysis
for the purpose of determining the required recertification
interval.
1.2.1 A Criticality Code 1 indicates that the vessel, system
or component being analyzed has a Risk Assessment Code
of 3 or is Mission Essential with no redundancy, or has
a Remaining Life of 6 years or less, or any combination
of the above conditions.
1.2.2 A Criticality Code 2 indicates that the vessel, system
or component being analyzed has a Risk Assessment Code
of 4 or is Mission Essential with redundancy, or is not
Mission Essential but has a cost of failure greater
than $5,000, or has a Remaining Life of 6 to 12 years,
or any combination of the above conditions.
1.2.3 A Criticality Code 3 indicates that the vessel, system
or component being analyzed has a Risk Assessment Code
of 5 or 6, and is not Mission Essential and has a cost
of failure less than $5,000/ and has a Remaining Life
greater than 12 years.
Requirements
NHB 1700.6, Guide for In-service Inspection of Ground-Based
Pressure Vessels and Systems requires that inspection
intervals used for specific systems should be based on
detailed analyses and examination. It further requires that
the results of these analyses be fully documented to clearly
-i-
1.4
1.5
show how the detailed analyses and examination, when
considered on an integrated basis, provide appropriate safety
for the service life of the system. It should include the
rationale for deviations from codes or this Guide and
provide support for the resulting in-service inspection and
recertification plan.
Determination of Recertification Intervals
To determine the Inspection and Recertification Intervals,
follow the decision logic of Figure I and the following
paragraphs whose numbering corresponds to the numbering of the
logic diagram blocks.
1.4.1. The Risk Assessment Criticality Category will be
determined by following the procedures outlined in
Chapter 2. If the Risk Assessment criticality is
Category I, proceed to block 6. If the criti-
cality is 2 or 3, proceed to the appropriate Mission
Essentiality block 2.
1.4.2. The Mission Essentiality Criticality Category will be
determined by following the procedures outlined in
Chapter 3. If the Mission Essentiality Criticality is
Category i, proceed to block 6 of the Criticality is
2 or 3, proceed to the appropriate Remaining Life
block 3.
1.4.3. The Remaining Life Criticality Category will be
determined by following the procedures outlined in
Chapter 4. If the Remaining Life Criticality is
Category I, proceed to block 6. If the Criticality is
2 or 3, proceed to the appropriate block 4 or 5.
1.4.4. If the Pressure Vessel Criticality Code is 3, inspect
the pressure vessel at the lesser of 6 years or 1/2 of
the remaining life. See Figure 8, Chapter 5 for
component inspection requirements.
1.4.5. If the Pressure Vessel Criticality Code is 2, inspect
the pressure vessel at the lesser of 3 years or 1/2 of
the remaining life. See Figure 7, Chapter 5 for
component inspection requirements.
1.4.6. If the Pressure Vessel Criticality Code is I, inspect
the pressure vessel annually. See Figure 6, Chapter
5 for component inspection requirements.
Documentation
The Pressure Vessel Criticality Code and the recertification
interval shall be documented on the Pressure Vessel
Criticality Code and recertification Interval Documentation
Form (Attachment I) and be maintained in the Recertification
System files.
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RISK ASSESSMENT
2.0
2.1
2.2
Risk Assessment, Definition Of
The process of qualitative risk categorization or quantitative
risk estimation, followed by the evaluation of risk signifi-
cance. It provides for an estimation of the potential severity
and probability of occurrence of a system failure which then
allows for the assignment of a quantitative Risk Assessment
Code. (NASA Basic Safety Manual NHB 1700.1(VI-A) Proposed
APPENDIX A, Glossary of Terms).
Requirements
Recertification of Pressure Vessels and Systems will be
prioritized according to the risk or hazard of the potential
failure using risk assessment techniques. (NMI 1710.3B,
Design, Inspection and Certification of Pressure Vessels and
Pressurized Systems).
Determination of Risk Assessment Code (NASA Basic Safety
Manual NHB 1700.1 (VIA)).
The decision to assume risk is a management responsibility and
should be based on all relevant factors. The potential
severity and probability of a mishap should be a major
consideration in that decision.
2.2.1 Definitions
NASA hazardous conditions or operations will be
assigned a severity and probability index based
on the following:
a. Severity An assessment of the worst potential
consequence, defined by degree of injury, illness
or property damage which could occur. Severity
classification will be identified as follows:
i) Class I - Catastrophic - may cause death
or major system destruction.
2) Class II - Critical - may cause severe
injury, severe occupational illness or
major property damage.
3) Class III - Marginal - may cause minor
occupational illness or property damage.
4) Class IV - Negligible - probably would
not affect personnel safety or health but
is a violation of specific criteria.
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2.2.2
Do Probability The likelihood that an
identified hazard will result in a mishap
based on an assessment of such factors as
location, exposure in terms of cycles or
hours of operation and affected population.
Probability will be estimated as follows:
i) Estimate A - Likely to occur immediately
2) Estimate B - Probably will occur in time
3) Estimate C - May occur in time
4) Estimate D - Unlikely to occur
Risk Assessment Codes
The overall assessment of risk of a NASA hazardous
operation will be based on both the severity class and
probability estimate. A single number Risk Assessment
Code (RAC) will be assigned to each deficiency code as
shown in the matrix in Figure 2. This does not pre-
clude the use of locally developed systems for risk
assessment for local purposes only.
Severity
Class
Probability Estimate
A B C D
I 1 1 2 3
II 1 2 3 4
III 2 3 4 5
IV 3 4 5 6
2.3
Figure 2
RAC's I will be considered imminent danger and require
immediate attention and initiation of abatement
procedures. RAC's 2 will be considered serious and
require priority attention. All RAC's 3-6 are nonserious
and will be used in establishing the Criticality Category
for determining inspection and recertification intervals.
Determination of Risk Assessment Criticality Category
Once the Risk Assessment Code (RAC) has been assigned, the
Risk Assessment Criticality Category can be determined.
Criticality categories will be assigned to each Risk
Assessment Code as shown in the matrix in Figure 3.
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Risk
Assessment
Code
Criticality Category
1 Red Tag
2 Red Tag
3 1
4 2
5 3
6 3
Figure 3
2.4 Documentation
The maximum credible hazard, severity classification,
probability estimate, Risk Assessment Code (RAC) and Risk
Assessment Criticality Category shall be documented on the
Pressure Vessel Criticality Code and Inspection Interval
Documentation Form (Attachment I) and be maintained in the
Recertification System files.
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MISSION ESSENTIALITY
3.0
3.1
3.2
Mission Essential, Definition Of
A system element or function which must retain its operational
capability and integrity for safe mission conduct is con-
sidered to be "mission essential." This criticality category
assesses whether the system in question is essential to
conduct safe mission operations, and whether loss of such
system would result in severely restricted activities. (NASA
Basic Safety Manual NHB 1700.1 (VI-A) Proposed Appendix A,
Glossary of Terms).
Requirements
If the hazard potential of two or more systems are equal, then
the mission essentiality of the systems will be considered
when determining priorities (NMI 1710.3B Design, Inspection
and Certification of Pressure Vessels and Pressurized
Systems).
Determination of Mission Essentiality Criticality Category
To determine the Mission Essentiality Criticality Category,
follow the decision logic of Figure 4 and the following
paragraphs whose numbering corresponds to the numbering of the
logic diagram blocks.
3.2.1 Does the pressure vessel or system support flight
operations or other critical functions? Will the
failure of this vessel or system result in a delay or
cancellation of flight operations or other critical
functions?
3.2.2 Is there a redundant support capability that would
allow flight operations or other critical functions to
continue in the event of failure of the subject
pressure vessel or system?
3.2.3 Is the cost of a catastrophic failure of the subject
pressure vessel or system greater than $5,000? The
cost of failure should include not only the
replacement costs of the pressure vessel or system,
but also any costs associated with the repair of
damage to other systems, equipments or structures as
the result of a catastrophic failure.
3.2.4 If the subject pressure vessel or system supports
flight operations or other critical functions and
there is not a redundant support capability, assign
Mission Essentiality Criticality Category #i.
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3.3
3.2.5 If the subject pressure vessel or system supports
flight operations or other critical functions and
there is a redundant support capability or if the
subject pressure vessel or system does not support
flight operations or other critical functions but
the cost of failure is greater than $5,000, assign
Mission Essentiality Criticality Category #2.
3.2.6 If the subject pressure vessel or system does not
support flight operations or other critical functions
and the cost of failure is less than $5,000, assign
Mission Essentiality Criticality Category #3.
Documentation
The answers to all decision logic questions on Figure 4 along
with the Mission Essentiality Criticality Category shall be
documented on the Pressure Vessel Criticality Code and
Inspection Interval Documentation Form (Attachment i) and be
maintained in the Recertification System Files.
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REMAINING LIFE
4.0
4.1
4.2
Remaining Life, Definition Of
That period in years, for the actual wall thickness of a
pressure vessel to be reduced to the minimum required wall
thickness of the pressure vessel for the pressure relief
device set pressure by a known or assigned rate of corrosion.
Requirements
If the pressure vessel is to remain in service, the allowable
conditions of service and the length of time before the next
inspection shall be based on the conditions of the vessel as
determined by the inspection and the remaining life of the
vessel (ANSI/NB-23, 1987, National Board Inspection Code).
Determination Of Remaining Life Criticality Category
To determine the Remaining Life Criticality Category, follow
the decision logic of Figure 5 and the following paragraphs
whose numbering corresponds to the numbering of the logic
diagram blocks.
4.2.1 Is p times V greater than 5,000 psi ft.3? If the
maximum operating pressure in PSI, times the volume in
cubic feet, is greater than 5,000, assign life
criticality category #i and inspect annually. If the
maximum operating pressure times the volume is less
than 5,000, proceed with decision logic steps 2
through 20 to determine the remaining life of the
pressure vessel.
4.2.2 To determine the corrosion rate, calculate the
arithmetic mean for the head and shell for each year
that historical data is available. Trend these mean
values to determine at what rate the wall thickness is
being lost to corrosion. Values shall be reported in
inches/year.
4.2.3 Is the vessel susceptible to corrosion? If the vessel
is made of a carbon steel it is probably susceptible
to corrosion. If it is made of a corrosion resistant
material, assign life criticality category #3 and
inspect the vessel at a six year interval unless
otherwise di_ted by the Risk Assessment or Mission
Criticality ....alysis.
4.2.4 Is there evidence of internal corrosion? Does the
ultrasonic inspection records show that the vessel is
corroding on the inside or does visual examination
reveal external corrosion? If the vessel has been
previously inspected, this data will be available in
the Recertification File.
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4.2.5
4.2.6
4.2.7
4.2.8
4.2.9
Can the corrosion rate be quantified? If the vessel
has been in the Recertification Program for several
years, then there should be sufficient ultrasonic
thickness data for a trend analysis.
To determine the corrosion rate, calculate the
arithmetic mean for the head and shell for each year
that historical data is available. Trend these mean
values to determine at what rate the wall thickness
is being lost to corrosion. Values shall be re-
ported in inches/year.
For new pressure vessels and for vessels for which
service conditions are being changed, one of the
following methods shall be employed to determine the
probable rate of corrosion from which the remaining
wall thickness, at the time of the next inspection,
can be estimated:
ao the corrosion rate as established by data collected
by the owner or user on pressure vessels in the
same or similar service;
b. if data for the same or similar service are not
available, the corrosion rate as estimated from the
Inspector's knowledge and experience with pressure
vessels in similar service;
Cl if the probable corrosion rate cannot be determined
by either of the above-mentioned methods, on-stream
thickness determinations shall be made after
approximately 1,000 hours of service. Subsequent
sets of thickness measurements shall be taken after
additional similar intervals until the corrosion
rate is established (ANSI/NB-23, 1987, National
Board Inspection Code).
Calculate the corrosion allowance based on the current
inspection interval. The corrosion allowance is equal
to twice the annual corrosion rate in years times the
inspection interval in years (ANSI/NB-23, 1987,
National Board Inspection Code, V-IIS).
Calculate the minimum required wall thickness in inches
for the limiting section of the pressure vessel or
zone. The minimum required wall thickness shall be the
higher of the following as determined from the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code to which the vessel was
designed:
ao the calculated thickness required for the pressure
relieving device set pressure, static head or other
loading and design metal temperature.
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b. the minimum thickness permitted by the provision of
the applicable ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
section (ANSI/NB-23, 1987, National Board
Inspection Code, V-106).
4.2.10 Is the required minimum wall thickness greater than or
equal to the actual measured wall thickness? If the
required minimum wall thickness is greater than or
equal to the actual measured wall thickness, then the
pressure relief device set pressure must be reduced or
the inspection interval must be reduced or the
pressure vessel must be replaced. In which case, we
would proceed with decision logic steps 10 through 17.
If the required minimum wall thickness is less than the
actual measured wall thickness then we would proceed
with decision logic steps 18 through 23 and determine
the remaining life of the pressure vessel.
4.2.11 Is the pressure relief device set pressure more than
10% above the maximum operating pressure of the
pressure vessel? If it is, then the set pressure can
be reduced thereby decreasing the required minimum wall
thickness.
4.2.12 If the pressure relief device set pressure is to be
reduced, the pressure vessel or system must be derated.
NHB 1700.6, Guide for In-service Inspection of Ground-
Based Pressure Vessels and Systems defines Derated
Vessel or System as "a vessel or system that has been
judged to be unsafe, unsuitable or unnecessary for
continued operation at its original design pressure
and/or temperature limits and has been recertified to
operate at a lesser pressure and/or temperature limit
range.
4.2.13 Can the existing pressure relief device be reset to a
pressure equal to the maximum operating pressure plus
10%? This will effectively derate the pressure vessel
or system to its maximum operating pressure.
4.2.14 If the pressure relief device can be reset, reset it
to the maximum operating pressure plus 10%. Some
pressure relief devices are adjustable within a given
pressure range and others are not.
4.2.15 If the pressure relief device is not adjustable or
cannot be adjusted within its pressure range to the
maximum operating pressure plus 10%, then it must be
replaced with one that is set at the proper pressure
or is adjustable within the required range.
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4.2.16 Is the inspection and recertification interval greater
than one year? If it is, then the interval can be
reduced thereby decreasing the required minimum wall
thickness. Reducing the inspection interval decreased
the required minimum wall thickness because ANSI/NB-23,
1987, National Board Inspection Code, V-II5 requires
that a corrosion allowance of twice the estimated cor-
rosion loss before the date of the next inspection be
considered in the calculation for required wall
thickness.
4.2.17 If the inspection interval is greater than one year,
then it can be reduced and the corrosion allowance can
be recalculated utilizing the new interval. After
recalculating the corrosion allowance, you would re-
enter the decision logic at step 8.
4.2.18 If the inspection interval is not greater than one
year, then the vessel is no longer suitable for its
intended use and must be replaced.
4.2.19 The maximum allowable working pressure, for the
continued use of a pressure vessel, shall be
established by the ASME Code section to which the
vessel was built or by computation using the
appropriate formulas in the latest edition of the Code
if all essential details (such as upper and/or lower
temperature limits for the specific materials, quality
of materials and workmanship, knuckle radii of heads
and reinforcement of openings) are known to definitely
comply with the Code. In corrosive service the actual
thickness as determined by inspection minus twice the
estimated corrosion loss before the date of the next
inspection, shall be used for calculating the MAWP.
Suitable allowance shall be made for the other loadings
in accordance with the applicable section of the ASME
Code (ANSI/NB-23, 1987, National Board Inspection
Code, V-IIS).
4.2.20 Where the corrosion rate controls the life of the
pressure vessel, the remaining life shall be calculated
by the following formula:
Remaining life(years) = t actua_ t required
corrosion rate
(inches per year)
Where:
t actual = thickness in inches measured at the time of
inspection for the limiting section used in
the determination of t required.
-13-
4.3
t required = minimum allowable thickness in inches for
the limiting section of the pressure vessel
or zone shall be the higher of the following
as determined from the ASME Code to which
the vessel was designed:
i . the calculated thickness required for
the pressure relieving device set
pressure, static head or other loading
and design metal temperature.
. the minimum thickness permitted by the
provision of the applicable ASME Code
section.
4.2.21 Is remaining life one to six years, six to twelve years
or greater than twelve years?
4.2.22 If the remaining life is one to six years, assign Life
Criticality Category #I.
4.2.23 If the remaining life is six to twelve years, assign
Life Criticality Category #2.
4.2.24 If the remaining life is greater than twelve years,
assign Life Criticality Category #3.
Documentation
The answers to all decision logic questions on Figure 5 along
with the Life Criticality Category shall be documented on the
Pressure Vessel Criticality Category and Inspection Interval
Documentation Form (Appendix I) and be maintained in the
Recertification System files.
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INSPECTION AND RECERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
5.0
5.1
5.2
Inspection and Recertification Requirements, Definition Of
Those in-service tests and inspections performed after a
system has been initially put into service and those
appropriate tests, inspections, examinations, and
documentation by which a previously certified vessel or system
is qualified to continue or be returned to operation for the
recertification period (NASA, NHB 1700.6, Guide for In-service
Inspection of Ground-Based Pressure Vessels and Systems, dated
18 January 1976).
Requirements
Periodic inspection is necessary to ensure that a system
maintains its certification status. Results of inspections
and tests performed for certification should provide the base
for establishment of a comprehensive in-service inspection and
recertification plan. The plan should provide confidence in
structural integrity between recertification periods (NASA,
NHB 1700.6, Guide for In-service Inspection of Ground-Based
Pressure Vessels and Systems, dated 18 January 1976).
Inspection and Recertification Requirements
The in-service test, inspection and examination requirements
and the recertification test, inspection and examination
requirements for a six year recertification period are listed
on Figures 6, 7 and 8 for criticality categories i, 2 and 3
respectively. TMAC's and BMAC's that have not been previously
certified or that are being certified for more stringent
pressure and temperature service conditions should be
subjected to all of the tests and inspections listed on
Figures 6, 7 and 8 under Initial Examination for
Recertification. TMAC's and BMAC's that are currently part of
the Recertification Program may be entered into the 6 year
recertification schedule at any outyear based on previously
performed tests and inspections. This determination should be
done on a case basis and the balancing of the annual work load
should be considered when deciding where in the 6 year cycle
that an individual TMAC/BMAC should be currently logged.
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TEST REPORT
RECERT SYSTEM
NSI-43R-
PRESSURE VESSEL CRITICALITY CODE
AND INSPECTION INTERVAL
DOCUMENTATION FORM
I. Risk Assessment
I. Hazard
A. Severity Classification
B. Probability Estimate
2. Risk Assessment Code (RAC)
3. Risk Assessment Criticality Category
II. Mission Essentiality
i.
2.
3.
t
Is Pressure Vessel Required to Support Flight Operations?
Is There a Redundant Support Capability?
Is the Cost of a Maximum Credible Failure of the Vessel Greater
Than $5,000?
4. Mission Essentiality Criticality Category:
III. Remaining Life
i. Is PV Greater Than 5,000? PV =
2. Is Pressure Vessel Susceptible to Corrosion?
3. Is There Evidence of Internal Corrosion?
4. Can Corrosion Rate Be Quantified?
5. Calculated Corrosion Rate: S. So
o
7.
8.
9.
i0.
Ii.
PSI . FT3
Assigned Corrosion Rate: S. H.
Corrosion Allowance: S. H.
Required Minimum Thickness: S. H.
Is T Required Z T Actual?S, H.
Is PRV Set More Than 10% Above Maximum Operating Pressure:
Derate Pressure Vessel To: ps_
PRESSURE VESSEL CRITICALITY CODE
AND INSPECTION INTERVAL
DOCUMENTATION FORM
Page 2
12. Can PRV Be Reset to Operating Pressure + 10%?
13. PRV Reset Pressure:
14. Replace PRV:
15. Is Inspection Interval Greater Than 1 Year?
16. A) New Inspection Interval:
B) Recalculated Corrosion Allowance:
17. Replace Vessel:
18. Maximum Allowable Working Pressure:
19. Remaining Life:
20. Life Criticality Category:
IV. Pressure Vessel Criticality Code:
PS_
